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Abstract 
 
Academic spin-offs have received increasing attention in discussions about science 
and innovation policy and in research. Most of the attention has been focused on 
determining the conditions for fostering spin-offs, but this paper shifts the focus back to 
the potential repercussions for academic institutions. These may result from the 
involvement of researchers in spin-off processes and from incentives aimed at 
supporting spin-off activities. In a first step, the paper develops a conceptual framework 
with which to analyse repercussions that result from the interaction between policy 
measures for supporting spin-offs and structural features of national science systems. 
Policy measures and structural aspects of the science systems influence the ways 
spin-offs and their parent institutions interact. As patterns of linkages differ, so too may 
their impacts on academic institutions. Secondly, based on secondary analysis of 
comparative studies, we develop a number of hypotheses as to which repercussions 
on academic institutions may be expected in a number of European countries. The 
paper concludes by proposing implications for policy as well as for further research. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Akademische Ausgründungen (Spin-offs) haben in den letzten Jahren zunehmende 
Aufmerksamkeit in der Forschungs- und Innovationspolitik, in den wissenschaftlichen 
Institutionen wie Universitäten und Forschungsinstituten und in der Forschung selbst 
gewonnen. Dabei werden überwiegend die geeigneten Förderbedingungen für Aus-
gründungen diskutiert. In diesem Papier wenden wir hingegen den Blick zurück auf die 
wissenschaftlichen Institutionen und fragen, welche Rückwirkungen Ausgründungspro-
zesse sowie die Maßnahmen zur Förderung von Ausgründungsprozessen auf die 
wissenschaftlichen Institutionen und die wissenschaftliche Arbeit haben können. Das 
Papier gliedert sich in zwei Teile. Erstens präsentieren wir einen konzeptionellen 
Rahmen, der Rückwirkungen auf die wissenschaftlichen Institutionen in Abhängigkeit 
von den spezifischen Fördermaßnahmen wie von den spezifischen Strukturen des 
Wissenschaftssystems innerhalb eines Landes beschreibt. Ferner nehmen wir an, dass 
Fördermaßnahmen und die Struktur des Wissenschaftssystems auch die Beziehungen 
und Interaktionen zwischen Ausgründung und Mutterinstitution beeinflussen können. 
Die je unterschiedlichen Beziehungen können wiederum zu unterschiedlichen Effekten 
für die wissenschaftlichen Institutionen führen. Zweitens entwickeln wir, basierend auf 
einer Sekundäranalyse von vergleichenden Studien, Hypothesen dazu, welche Rück-
wirkungen in mehreren europäischen Ländern in Anbetracht der jeweiligen Bedingun-
gen zu erwarten sind. Das Papier schließt mit einem Ausblick auf Implikationen für 
Politik und weitere Forschung. 
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1 Introduction 
Established demarcations between the public science system and the political and 
economic system have become increasingly questioned in the past few years. More and 
more, the usefulness of scientific practice has to be demonstrated in order to legitimise 
public funds flowing into universities and public research institutes. Research and 
innovation policies in different countries aim at supporting industry-science-relations with 
the further aim to enhance the contribution of science to innovation, and ultimately 
economic welfare. At the same time, a number of scholars in science and innovation 
studies maintain that knowledge production and innovation increasingly take place in 
hybrid arrangements, where the industrial and academic as well as governmental 
spheres overlap (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000; Nowotny et al. 2001).  
One element of industry-science-relations which has received substantial attention lately 
is academic spin-offs, that is, firms founded by staff or graduates from universities or 
research institutes, which commercialize research results. Accordingly, a large number of 
national policies and support programmes for spin-off formation have been launched, in 
Europe and elsewhere. There are several comparative studies which describe, analyse, 
and partly benchmark different national policies and their interaction with the national 
innovation systems (Larédo & Mustar 2001; Polt et al. 2001; EU-Commission 2002; 
Koschatzky 2002; OECD 2002). A central interest of these studies is to assess the 
performance of these policies with regard to technology and knowledge transfer from 
science to industry.  
In the present study, we analyse these phenomena from a different perspective. We 
assume that the creation and operation of spin-offs as well as the supporting policies may 
retroact – positively or negatively - on the core of the science system. So, these 
seemingly “marginal” activities would not only transform or perhaps shift the boundary 
zone between science and industry. In the long run, it may also transform the research 
activity within academic institutes. More precisely, we will develop a number of 
hypotheses as to which repercussions on the science system related to spin-off 
supporting measures may be expected in a number of European countries. By science 
system, we refer to research institutions, i.e. universities and public research institutes, 
their specific organisation and institutional frameworks, as well as the typical practices 
and processes within these research institutions. Policy measures targeted at supporting 
spin-off creation may impact the science systems in different ways. Firstly, they may 
impact the science systems by modifying institutional structures and framework 
conditions (‘top-down repercussions’). This may affect research priorities and practices in 
the respective research institutions. Secondly, these policy measures may also 
encourage more or less intense linkages between spin-offs and research institutions. By 
linkages, we refer to various formal and informal relationships and interactions between 
spin-offs and parent institution, e.g. research co-operations, shared staff, regular 
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exchanges, contract research, etc. (see also 2.2). The structure of linkages may then 
affect the repercussions, which can be expected to result from the involvement of 
academic staff in the creation and operation of spin-offs (‘bottom-up repercussions’).  
Which effects are to be expected depends on the specific supporting measures chosen in 
each country and on the specific structures of the national science systems, as well as 
the interaction between both. Accordingly, we will estimate how repercussions may vary 
depending on differences between national styles of spin-off promotion and the specific 
characteristics of the national science systems. We analyse, in how far these measures 
are likely to impact the science system, either by modifying institutional structures and 
framework conditions or by encouraging specific types of linkages between spin-offs and 
research institutions. As we will not be able to collect original empirical evidence, our 
primary aim is to elaborate and specify hypotheses based on secondary analysis. As a 
background we draw on a study of (Goldfarb & Henrekson 2003), who present the 
American and the Swedish science system and policy styles as two opposed quasi ideal 
types. The American model is presented as an example where policy and science system 
interact in a way that is highly conducive to spin-off creation. The Swedish model rather 
disencourages such activities. Against this background, we compare policies and science 
systems of other selected European countries (UK, France, Germany and Finland) and ask 
which repercussions on the science system we may expect in each country, and whether we 
may identify a homogeneous European model of spin-off creation, or in what respect we 
have to distinguish different sub-models and national styles. 
It has been shown that a wide variety of spin-off types exist. Spin-offs vary considerably 
with regard to their growth patterns as well as the relationships to their parent institution 
(Stankiewicz 1994; Rappert & Webster 1998; Mustar 2003; Knie et al. 2003; Potthast & 
Lengwiler 2005). This prompts the question, whether in different countries the specific 
conditions favour certain types of spin-offs over others. Therefore, we will try to estimate 
the diversity of the structural forms of spin-offs in Europe as a result of this interaction. As 
a conclusion, we may then ask about 
the implications for policy to deal with 
the complexity of the spin-off pheno-
menon at the interface between science, 
policy and industry. With regard to the 
“Crossover”-project this study is a part 
of, the analysis will help to position the 
specific situation of German spin-offs in 
the context of other European countries 
and thus contribute to the contextuali-
sation and generalisation of the projects’ 
core results. 
comparison of science systems 
and policy measures
repercussions on 
academic institutions
types of 
spin-offs
patterns of linkages 
spin-off - parent org.
Figure 1: Structure of argument
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The report is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the conceptual framework for the 
comparative study. It starts with a presentation of the ideal type distinction of spin-off 
promotion proposed by Goldfarb and Henrekson. This is followed by a presentation of 
recent findings on the scope of variation among spin-offs and the linkages between spin-
offs and research institutions. We then describe major supporting measures and assess 
their likely repercussions on the national science systems. Section 3 sketches a number 
of key characteristics of the science system and spin-off promotion policy for the UK, 
Germany, France and Finland. In section 4, a comparison of these profiles leads us to 
propose a number of guiding hypotheses for the specific repercussions on science 
systems and diverging patterns of spin-offs in these countries. We conclude by proposing 
implications from a policy-oriented research perspective as well as for further research.  
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2 The interplay between science policy, parent 
institutions and spin-offs 
2.1 Spin-off policies and the structure of the national science 
systems 
There exists a long tradition of research comparing different national systems of 
innovation aiming at the identification of strengths and weaknesses of different 
approaches. Focussing on the subsets of the US and Swedish innovation systems that 
affect the commercialisation of university technology and particularly commercialisation 
through academic spin-offs, Goldfarb and Henrekson (2003) maintain that the (conti-
nental) European science systems may be considered as a homogenously structured 
cluster that differs more or less clearly from the US-American system. 
In a comparative analysis of the Swedish and the American system, they put forward the 
hypothesis that the American university system and the measures chosen for promoting 
commercialisation of academic research are more efficient than the Swedish model and, 
as an implication, continental European models more generally. This is put down to the 
differences in the university systems and the national policies. They argue that the 
American university system provides a different incentive structure to researchers to 
engage in commercialisation activities. Drawing on findings from Jensen and Thursby 
(2001), this is considered as highly important, since commercialisation of research often 
requires researchers to remain involved in the process, largely because of the tacit nature 
of the knowledge required for successful commercialisation.1 Differences in the incentive 
structure for researchers result from the interplay between policy type and incentives 
given to universities and their organisational structure. 
The American policy type is presented as a bottom-up approach. By conceding 
universities property rights to inventions resulting from university research financed by 
federal grants, American policy, more precisely the Baye-Dole Act, created an incentive 
for universities to facilitate the commercialisation of academic R&D without, however, 
prescribing by which specific measures this should be realised. Largely, this is done by 
technology licensing offices run by universities. The organisational structure of 
universities being rather decentralised with a strong competition for research personnel 
and research funds, universities tend to give academic staff a stronger incentive for 
commercialisation to keep or attract research personnel. Research personnel is granted 
more freedom to engage in commercialisation activities while at the same time keeping 
                                                
1  Similar findings are reported by Webster and Packer (1997) with respect to the efforts needed 
to assist young firms in taking up the patents of researchers. 
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the position as a faculty member than in the Swedish system. Furthermore, in case of 
successful commercialisation, not only the inventor, but also the school or faculty is 
rewarded, thereby giving an incentive for the larger environment of an inventor to support 
commercialisation activities. 
In contrast to this, the Swedish system is characterised as centralised and rather bureau-
cratic. There is only little competition for academic personnel. Evaluation criteria give 
researchers no incentive to dedicate time and efforts to commercialisation, since this 
would distract them from pursuing their academic work. Property rights remain with the 
inventor, which, at first glance, has the paradoxical effect that he or she in general has 
only moderate interest in taking the risk of commercialisation in comparison to a large 
institution such as a university.2 Accordingly, universities have no direct incentive to foster 
commercialisation activities of research personnel. Swedish policy has put considerable 
effort into supporting the commercialisation of research and, more particularly, in fostering 
spin-offs. However, it follows a top-down model prescribing the specific form, e.g. regional 
technology transfer institutions, but hasn’t changed the incentive structure for universities, 
faculties and academics. 
Taking the analysis of Goldfarb and Henrekson one step further, we may hypothesise 
that the impact of commercialisation strategies on the science system is likely to be more 
profound in the American than in the Swedish system. While in the Swedish system, 
activities related to commercialisation are treated as marginal activities, in the American 
system, the boundary between academic work and commercialisation seems to be less 
clearly defined. Hence, research practices and priorities at the level of the individual 
researcher as well as at the level of the faculty may be more easily affected than in the 
Swedish case. This is touched upon by the authors when pointing to the possible 
compromise of academic norms, which is implied by the American model. Furthermore, 
the analysis illustrates that the effects of commercialisation strategies on the science 
system result from the interplay of both, the structure of the science system and the 
specific policy approach. Accordingly, the authors conclude that a straightforward 
imitation of American policy, e.g. granting intellectual property rights to universities, may 
not yield the same results in the Swedish context.  
For the following, it is important to note that Goldfarb and Henrekson’s analysis seems to 
be implicitly based on a specific model of the interaction between spin-offs and their 
parent institution. By highlighting the importance of researchers remaining continuously 
involved in the commercialisation process, and, at the same time, the importance of the 
transfer of tacit knowledge, they refer to a model that is based on rather strong linkages 
between parent institution and spin-off. Moreover, their analysis suggests that the US 
                                                
2  For a similar argumentation see OECD (2002: 52). 
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policy and science model is not only more conducive to spin-off creation in general than 
the Swedish model, but, more specifically, it seems to be more conducive to spin-offs 
based on strong linkages. In the next section, we will take a closer look at different 
models and empirical findings on how spin-off and parent institution interrelate.  
The authors’ hypothesis that the Swedish model is likely to be representative for a larger 
cluster of similarly structured science systems in continental Europe, and that therefore 
their findings should be transferable, is not too convincing. Comparative studies focussing 
on Europe illustrate the important heterogeneity of science systems in Europe and the 
relative importance of spin-offs. Thus, we use their findings as a background and a 
starting point for comparing national structures of science systems and policy approaches. 
This analysis will not only allow us to test the hypothesis of convergent European science 
systems and policy approaches, but it will serve as a basis to appraise repercussions of 
policies and support measures on the science systems in the different countries.   
 
2.2 The interaction between research institutions and spin-offs 
As stated above, we expect that policy measures for promoting spin-offs may also impact 
the science systems indirectly by encouraging or discouraging specific types of linkages 
between spin-offs and research institutions which may, as such, affect research institu-
tions. Therefore, we will now take a more systematic look at different models of how 
research institutions and spin-offs interact. Basically, this interaction will be more or less 
intense and formalised. At the one end of intensity we locate spin-offs which, at least after 
the creation phase, do not engage in any formal or informal relations with their parent 
institution. At the other end, we find spin-offs and parent institutions which interact 
intensely and continuously, either on a formal or informal basis. An intermediary form 
would be relations which are concentrated at a certain point in time, e.g. transfer of 
intellectual property rights or short-term contract research. Formal relations are those 
which are underpinned by a contract or the licensing of property rights. A formal linkage 
between spin-off and parent organisation may also be the sharing of personnel, e.g. a 
researcher who holds a position or equity in a spin-off while keeping his academic posi-
tion, or the conduct of diploma or doctoral theses in a spin-off (see also figure 4 below). 
We may differentiate between two ideal types 
or models of how spin-offs and their parent 
organisation interact. According to the first 
model, spin-offs decouple largely from the 
parent institution after the creation phase. 
This model of interaction could be interpreted 
as referring implicitly to a triple helix II model. 
In the triple helix II model, the institutional 
state academia
spin-off
parent 
institution
industry
Figure 2: spin-off model according to triple helix II
 13
spheres of academia, industry and state are separate with strong borders dividing them 
and highly circumscribed relations among the spheres (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000: 
111).3 Accordingly, spin-offs are supposed to “migrate” from the academic sphere to the 
industry sphere (see figure 2). Relations to the academic sphere and the parent institution 
as part of it should not be too intense and highly circumscribed.  
In the second model spin-offs function as a 
triple helix III organisation. In contrast to the 
triple helix II model, triple helix III generates a 
knowledge infrastructure with overlapping 
institutional spheres, where each may take over 
the roles of the others, and with hybrid 
organisations emerging at the interfaces. Spin-
offs may then be interpreted as such hybrid 
organisations located where the academic and 
industrial sphere overlap (figure 3). They function as interface structures bridging industry 
and academia (Etzkowitz et al. 2000), rather than organisations migrating from academia 
to industry. Relationships between spin-off and the parent organisation are rather intense 
and not always clearly defined.  
The first model is, as a normative model, often advocated by (German) transfer institu-
tions (Potthast & Lengwiler 2005). However, empirical findings show that many spin-offs 
do not follow this model, and that it may not even be a highly successful one. In a 
comprehensive longitudinal survey of French spin-offs, it was shown that firms, which 
established strong links with academia were most successful, measured by survival rates 
as well as growth rates (Mustar 1997). Generally, linkages with academia decline after 
the creation phase, but they still remain highly important for a large number of spin-offs. 
According to Mustar (2003b), for four out of five enterprises, linkages with the parent 
organisation are important in the creation phase, while after six years this holds for half of 
the firms. Similar findings are reported in a German survey (Egeln et al. 2002).  
As for the type of interaction between spin-off and parent organisation – or spin-off and 
academia more generally – a number of studies show that this interaction can partly be 
characterised as belonging to a hybrid sphere, where academic and commercial activities 
are not clearly separated. This is quite obvious in cases where spin-offs are engaged in 
joint research projects with research institutions, particularly publicly funded research, 
and joint publishing (Mustar 1997; Egeln et al. 2002; Potthast & Lengwiler 2005). Also, 
the participation of diploma and doctoral students in spin-offs is part of these hybrid 
                                                
3  Triple helix I refers to a configuration, where the nation state encompasses academia and 
industry and directs the relations between them. 
state academia
spin-off
parent 
institution
industry
Figure 3: spin-off model according to triple helix III
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activities. The sharing of 
personnel, when the same 
person holds a position in 
the spin-off and acade-
mia at the same time is 
less clear. Yet it seems 
likely that also here 
boundaries between acti-
vities in both institutions 
may partly be blurred 
(see figure 4, the grey 
areas symbolise linkages 
which are supposed to 
signify hybrid - dark 
grey - or potentially hybrid - light grey - constellations).  
As has been shown, these hybrid constellations are not only quite common4, but also 
considered as conducive to the spin-off and to the research sphere.5 Mustar (1997) found 
that spin-off firms did benefit strongly from the participation in publicly funded research 
projects. These benefits occurred partly indirectly through the establishment of network 
ties, which were essential for the development of the firm, and not so much through the 
development of commercial products within the project. Potthast & Lengwiler (2005) 
report that research institutes and research personnel take advantage of spin-offs by 
working in both institutions at the same time or successively, thereby acquiring the neces-
sary industry experience for a professorship at a polytechnic, by co-operating in research 
projects, or by allocating research personnel that can no longer be employed in the 
parent institution. On the other hand, the blurring of boundaries between science and 
business may also lead to problematic effects. Scientists with a financial interest in their 
research are likely to face conflicts of interests which may result in biased research 
results or a disincentive to share research results (Krimsky 1999; 2006). Furthermore, 
publicly funded research, i.e. personnel, space and equipment, may be diverted to 
support private profits. 
                                                
4  Mustar (2003b) found that more than a third of the French firms which were part of his study 
published scientific articles. A German survey reported that about half of the spin-offs held 
contacts to research institutions and about a quarter engaged in joint R&D (Egeln et al. 2002: 
38f.). About half of the spin-offs held informal contacts to academia, about a third employed 
students for internships and diploma theses, a little less sold products and services to research 
institutions, engaged in joint research projects and further education of their staff and about a 
fifth commissioned contracts to academia. 
5  Most of the research on linkages and interactions between spin-off and parent organisation 
considers the conduciveness of these linkages for the spin-off, only some reflect on the 
consequences for the parent organisation. 
intensity of 
linkages
formality of 
linkages
continuous and 
intense
low
informal formal
Figure 4: types of interactions by intensity and formality
none
concentrated at 
points in time
researchers 
participating in SO
joint research
product selling
diploma thesis
regular informal 
meetings
mediation of 
contacts
joint publications
IPR transfer
informal exchange
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Most likely, it depends on a variety of specific conditions, how a certain type of interaction 
affects research institutions. Knie et al. (2003) set up a typology of spin-off creation proc-
esses showing that in some cases, parent institutions benefit from a hybrid constellation 
whereas in other cases, such a constellation is rather harmful. They also showed that an 
intense interaction may be of a more hybrid type as well as clearly defined and both may 
be productive.  
Finally, and independent of the type of interaction, research institutions may also draw 
more indirect benefits from spin-off creation. Spin-off creation has been reported to be 
conducive to the image of a university or research institute. It is considered as a sign of a 
dynamic institution, thereby attracting young researchers and helping to attract public 
funding. It is also considered as a sign of a dynamic region (EU-Commission 2002; 
Mustar 2003). 
The assumptions on how spin-off and parent organisation interact are coupled with 
assumptions on what is the specific function spin-offs are supposed to fulfil for the 
economy and, more precisely, the innovation system. Whilst according to an earlier 
understanding which is by now largely rejected, spin-offs were supposed to significantly 
contribute to job creation: nowadays they are considered to fulfil a significant function in 
the innovation system. They are supposed to serve as mediators, translators or catalysts 
between academia and industry, going back and forth between science and markets 
(Mustar 2003). Similarly, Stankiewicz (1994) proposed to value spin-offs mainly because 
of their specific function in knowledge production filling certain gaps which neither 
academia nor industry are likely to fill, e.g. the development of technologies that are yet 
too generic for a company and, on the other hand, require a scale and financing which is 
beyond what can generally be achieved in an academic setting. 
So, rather strong linkages between spin-offs and parent institutions or other research 
institutions and hybrid functions seem to be an important characteristic of spin-offs in 
general. Yet, a closer look shows that these characteristics may vary for different types of 
spin-offs. Quite a number of authors have put forward various typologies to capture the 
heterogeneity of spin-offs, partly with the intention to propose adequate and differentiated 
supporting structures for spin-off creation. These studies take the available resources, the 
business model or the linkages to the parent institution6 as the central differentiating 
dimensions (for an overview see Mustar et al. 2006). Furthermore, types of spin-offs and 
                                                
6  The referenced studies focusing on the relation of spin-offs with their parent organisation 
mostly analyse how decisions made by the parent institution influence the starting configuration 
and the business model. For example, they analyse what type of supportive structures are 
given to spin-offs. However, this does not give information about the interaction between parent 
institution and spin-off in their regular activities. 
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their interaction with academia have shown to vary according to the technological sector 
they are part of (Rappert & Webster 1998; Gewin 2005). 
Most relevant to us, Stankiewicz (1994)7 proposes three types of spin-offs based on their 
mode of activity, that is, consultancy and R&D contracting, products or technology assets. 
Spin-offs may also fulfil several of these modes or change them over time. These modes 
differ among other features in the type of linkages to academia. The consultancy mode is 
characterised by strong linkages with academia; they may also be run by academics 
retaining their university position. For spin-offs mainly following the product mode, strong 
links are considered as not advisable, because growth orientation and business-like 
attitude seem to be more important here, and the academic environment is not conducive 
for this. Still, in most cases, some links are retained with academia. The third type of spin-
offs develops technologies which are then commercialised through other firms. They 
largely rely on intellectual property rights. Here again close links to academia are 
considered as rather conducive, not the least because of the possibility to recruit 
adequate personnel (see figure 5 for an estimation which of the linkages described above 
are most relevant for the different types of spin-offs).  
 
Figure 5: Types of linkages and their relevance for specific types of spin-offs 
 
As for the degree of formalisation of the linkages between spin-offs and parent 
organisations, informal linkages seem to be as important, or even more so, than formal 
                                                
7  A similar model is proposed by Druilhe & Garnsey (2004). 
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linkages.8  In a qualitative study of about 40 British spin-offs, informal linkages, e.g. 
regular personal contacts or exchange of equipment, testing and feedback, were reported 
as equally or more important than formal linkages. Partly informal linkages accompany or 
support formal ones. Informal linkages provide various knowledge flows, which 
incorporate a variety of codified and tacit knowledge and skills concerning theory, 
experimentation procedures, material and interpretation, and research organisation 
(Rappert 1997; Rappert & Webster 1998). Similarly, a quantitative study of German spin-
offs reported informal linkages for half of the spin-offs, more than for any other type of 
linkages (Egeln et al. 2002, see footnote 4). These findings point in a similar direction as 
the assumption underlying the reasoning of Goldfarb & Henrekson, according to which a 
continuous involvement of university staff is required for successful commercialisation of 
research results. 
On the other hand, formal linkages, particularly intellectual property rights, seem to be 
less important for spin-offs than generally assumed. According to the above-mentioned 
quantitative survey, patents played only a marginal role for the creation of spin-offs. Egeln 
et al. (2002) found that 5% or less than 1% of spin-offs were created on the basis of a 
patent.9 Again, the situation varies for different types of spin-offs. Intellectual property 
rights seem to be of minor importance for spin-offs in the IT sector and only somewhat 
important for those developing scientific instruments and new materials (Rappert et al. 
1999). More precisely, it may be that the increased attention to intellectual property, as 
valid as it may be, may have perverted effects inhibiting in some cases co-operation 
among academia and industry and ultimately technology transfer rather than facilitating it 
(Webster & Packer 1997, Rappert et al. 1999, Gewin 2005). 
2.3 How policy measures may impact research institutions 
There is a variety of policies and support measures which aim at the promotion of 
academic spin-offs. These measures are located at three different levels. The first type of 
measures addresses the micro level of potential entrepreneurs in academia and is 
targeted specifically at raising awareness and providing the necessary entrepreneurial 
competences for them. The second type addresses the meso level by setting up 
intermediary institutions that support founders of spin-offs and the respective research 
institutions. These are technology centres, incubators, consulting networks, information 
networks and databases, as well as the provision of financial resources, e.g. seed capital. 
The third type addresses the macro level of institutional structures of research institutions 
                                                
8  This contrasts somewhat with the high attention which is given to formal linkages, particularly 
those concerning intellectual property rights, in recent debates on the commercialisation of 
research results. 
9  Furthermore, the percentage of patent-based spin-offs is much higher for spin-offs from 
research institutes than for those coming from universities. 
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and framework conditions. These measures concern legislation and regulation, e.g. civil 
servants law, institutional settings in universities and research institutes, e.g. evaluation 
criteria and procedures, individual remuneration, financing sources, institutional missions 
and organisational cultures and recruitment policies. Meso and macro level measures are 
often not specifically targeted at spin-off promotion, but industry-science-relations more 
generally.10 
These measures may be more or less effective for the promotion of spin-off activity. In 
general, as has been claimed before, effectiveness may not be assessed independently 
from the prevalent structures of the national science system. What is more important to 
us, is that these support measures do not only impact spin-off activity and industry-
science relations, but may also have consequences for the core business of research 
institutions. Again, these effects will depend on the structure of the national science 
systems. Effects on the science system which may affect research institutions both 
positively and negatively could be the following:  
• changes in the content, structure and practices of research and teaching  
• rearrangement of research agendas  
• effects on internal or external career opportunities 
• organisational changes (within research institutions or in the relations between 
institutions) 
• additional funding resources  
• additional requirements, if commercialisation efforts are requested for research 
activities, e.g. for the acquisition of project funding 
Next to impacts on the structure of 
the science system, measures may 
also influence the relationship 
between parent institution and 
spin-off. That is, they may influ-
ence the intensity of linkages, 
formal as well as informal linkages. 
This is all the more important, 
since we assume that interactions 
between spin-off and parent orga-
nisation, particularly those of a 
hybrid type, may result in further 
repercussions on the parent organisation and, potentially, the wider academic 
                                                
10  For a similar classification see Polt et al. (2001: 30). 
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Figure 6: repercussions of policy measures on research institutions
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environment. We call the first type of repercussions top-down and the second type, 
resulting from the interaction between spin-off and parent organisation, bottom-up 
repercussions (see figure 6). Bottom-up repercussions may affect research institutions 
positively as well as negatively.  
They may take the form of  
• changes in the content and practices of research and research agendas, e.g. a 
stronger application orientation or a reluctance to exchange research results  
• new career opportunities for academic staff  
• enlarging the capacities and sharpening the profile of research institutions 
• privatising research and drawing off personnel, thus extracting competences and 
capacities 
• conflicts of interest at the level of the individual researcher or an institute arising from 
the involvement in both research and business 
• additional funding resources.  
In the following, we present a short overview of the impacts on the science system which 
can be expected from the different measures. 
 
Measures at the macro level 
Participation of academic staff in enterprises and leave regulation: In recent years, restric-
tions have been reduced in a number of countries which relate to the possibility for 
university staff to participate in private industry activities or to leave their position 
temporarily. These regulations may show effects on the relationship between parent 
institution and spin-off, because they facilitate the parallel involvement of researchers in 
spin-offs and academic research. As a consequence, we may expect that this type of 
arrangement supports intense interactions of a hybrid nature between spin-off and parent 
organisation. This may then affect research and teaching agendas and practices in the 
parent institution, mainly the respective department. Potentially, this may also have more 
general spill-over effects for the research institution. 
Intellectual property rights: Regulations concerning intellectual property generated by 
publicly funded research differ between countries. Some accord property rights to the 
researcher/professor, some to the institution. Royalties from intellectual property rights 
are partly distributed among researcher and institution. In a couple of countries, the 
regulation has recently been changed mostly by transferring property rights from the 
individual researcher to the institution. When intellectual property rights are granted to 
research institutions, we may generally expect an increase in the attention given to the 
economic potential of research for two reasons. Increased attention may result from 
expected financial rewards. How strong this increase is though, is unclear. Only some 
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universities are reported to generate substantial income by royalties, while the majority is 
not even able to remunerate the costs of supporting structures (Webster & Packer 1997; 
Gewin 2005). In addition, attention may increase, because research institutions become 
responsible for the management of intellectual property rights, whatever the generated 
income may be. 
Academic evaluation criteria: We expect that changes in academic evaluation criteria and 
procedures, either at the level of individual researchers, projects, or institutions may have 
strong effects on the science system. They change the incentive structure for academic 
work in general and, in the longer term, this may affect the selection of research 
personnel. In addition, evaluation criteria which reward commercialisation activities may 
have an effect on the linkages between spin-offs and parent institutions, because they do 
not discourage, or even provide an incentive, for researchers to engage in the creation 
and operation of spin-offs.  
 
Measures at the meso level 
Transfer institutions: Transfer institutions as such may not necessarily affect the science 
system, since they function as an add-on to the existing institutional structure. This 
assumption is supported by a study of German transfer offices at universities (Krücken 
2003). The transfer offices, which were mainly pushed by political actors but received 
only small interest from academia and industry, served symbolic functions, while the 
“transfer business” largely continued as usual, that is, mainly based on direct and 
informal relations between individual researchers and industry actors. Considering that 
transfer offices meet difficulties in changing transfer practices, it seems even less likely 
that they have a strong impact on the regular academic practices. Of course, the impact 
will also depend on the specific institutionalisation of the offices. For instance, we would 
expect stronger effects if transfer offices were part of research institutions as if these 
were regional initiatives. 
Supporting measures for the creation process11: The provision of counselling services, 
the mediation of business contacts, business plan competitions, incubators and financial 
support, e.g. in the form of seed capital, is a typical part of spin-off programmes. These 
measures may also be considered as add-ons, which will probably not directly affect the 
science system. Transfer offices, as well as business plan competitions and support 
measures for the founding phase may affect the interaction between spin-offs and their 
parent institution, if they support a specific model of spin-off and orientate the particular 
                                                
11  These measures are partly, but not always, implemented by or in co-operation with transfer 
offices. Therefore, they are presented as a separate point.  
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advice and support they are giving accordingly. By this, depending on the preferred 
model, they may either en- or discourage strong linkages with parent institutions. 
 
Measures at the micro level 
Programmes for creating awareness and providing qualification in entrepreneurship: 
These programmes are largely, though not solely, targeted at master and doctoral 
students. They do not imply direct changes in the structure of the science system. 
However, they may slowly enhance the attention for the economic potential for research 
results and thereby contribute to changes in the cultural attitude towards commer-
cialisation. 
Summarising these assumptions, we may hypothesise that macro measures changing 
the institutional settings may have the strongest effect for research institutions. Micro 
measures targeted at the entrepreneurial culture in research institutions may have 
indirect effects, while measures at the meso level, that is, specific institutions and 
programmes for supporting the business creation process, should have the least effect.  
Concerning the linkages between spin-offs and their parent organisations, we 
hypothesise that leave regulations and commercial engagement may influence the formal 
linkages between parent institutions and spin-offs. Also regulation of intellectual property 
rights will be important here. Evaluation criteria and criteria for project funding may have 
an effect on formal as well as informal linkages (see figure 7). Measures at the 
intermediary and micro level may have an effect on the relationship depending on the 
specific spin-off model.  
Figure 7: Impact of framework conditions on specific types of linkages 
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3 The interaction between science and technology 
policy and science systems: an international 
comparison  
In this section we compare the structure of science systems and the type of policies and 
support measures towards spin-off creation in a number of European countries. Firstly, 
we estimate the repercussions which policy measures may exert on the science systems. 
Secondly, we estimate whether the set of measures in each country encourages specific 
types of linkages between spin-off and parent organisation.  
The analysis of country profiles is structured according to the dimensions referred to by 
Goldfarb and Henrekson. First, the organisational structure of research institutions 
(centralised versus decentralised systems) is presented, followed by the incentive 
structure for academic staff to engage in commercialisation of research results (e.g. 
evaluation criteria, structure of funding, leave regulations). Then, we identify incentives 
for research institutions to support the commercialisation of research results, mainly the 
regulation of intellectual property rights. In addition to the dimensions of Goldfarb and 
Henrekson, we add cultural attitudes as a further element which may influence the 
behaviour of researchers and research institutions.12 Finally, we try to ascertain the policy 
type (top-down versus bottom-up). The analysis is based on secondary analysis. The 
main source for each country is stated at the beginning of the section, other sources are 
cited. An overview of the characteristics of the countries is given in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix.  
As our research interest lies on the possible repercussions of measures for spin-off 
promotion on the science system, we will not look in detail at the specific performance in 
spin-off creation of the different countries. Moreover, data on spin-off creation at a 
national level are notoriously difficult to generate and the comparability of the data is 
problematic (Callan 2001; OECD 2002). As far as data is available, the rate of spin-off 
creation does not differ strongly between the countries in our sample (see Appendix). Still, 
the pattern of linkages between spin-off and parent organisation may differ between the 
countries. Apparently no representative data are available on this issue (OECD 2001: 40).  
 
                                                
12  This variable has to be considered with caution though, since we expect cultural attitudes to 
vary also between institutions and not only at a national level. 
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3.1 United Kingdom13 
The British university system shows a number of similarities to the American model. It is 
decentralised in the sense that universities are independent institutions and employees 
are not civil servants; there are no common working contract schemes. The situation is 
different for research institutes, where researchers are partly civil servants. Research 
activities in universities are concentrated in a small number of institutions. Funding is 
provided mainly on a competitive basis. Basic funding is distributed following the results 
of a regular disciplinary evaluation procedure, the Research Assessment Exercise. In 
addition, funding can be obtained for specific research projects. The set of criteria 
underlying the competitive funding is focussed on academic performance and 
commercialisation efforts are not rewarded. Therefore, similar to the situation in Sweden, 
this type of competition creates an incentive to concentrate on academic work and, in 
contrast to the American model, cannot be expected to facilitate the engagement of 
researchers in spin-offs and other commercialisation efforts requiring a substantial 
engagement of the researcher (OECD 2002: 140).14 This has been criticised and a “third 
leg” of funding, in addition to research and teaching, has been established.15 This funding 
has been used largely for the setting up of intermediary organisations, improvement of 
intellectual property right infrastructure and enterprise training for staff (DTI 2002). It 
remains an open question, if this is able to counterbalance the effects from the evaluation 
system working against commercialisation activities.16 
The regulation of intellectual property rights has changed over the last 20 years and also 
differed between institutions. Different (centralised) institutional bodies were entitled to 
intellectual property rights and their exploitation. As an exception, Cambridge University 
followed a liberal and seemingly successful approach. Researchers have been granted 
the intellectual property rights and no specific policy or restrictions as to the engagement 
of researchers in commercial activities were given, but also only little institutionalised 
support. Recently, there has been a development in the direction toward a more 
structured approach in convergence with developments in other universities (Druilhe & 
Garnsey 2004). Now, the management of intellectual property rights in universities is very 
                                                
13  If not stated otherwise, this section is based on Polt et al. (2001). 
14  In a similar vein, an empirical study came to the conclusion that the transfer of IPR to univer-
sities (see below) does not automatically result in substantial incentives for researchers to 
engage strongly in patenting, since patenting distracts researchers from their primary objective, 
that is publishing. This is all the more important against the background of the British evaluation 
procedures (Webster & Packer 1997). 
15  The Higher Education Innovation Fund, formerly the HEROBAC programme, see (DTI 2000; 
2002) and http://www.hefce.ac.uk/reachout/heif/heif1.asp. 
16  This caveat concerning the effects of HEIF for the activity of researchers seems all the more 
important, since in the past much of the funding has gone to non-research intensive higher 
education institutions (DTI 2002). However, this may change, since in the future HEIF funding 
will be distributed to a large extent based on a formula that reflects strongly academic staff 
members (OST 2005). 
  24 
similar to the situation in the US. The sharing of royalties varies between institutions. In 
national research institutes researchers are mostly civil servants and have no comparable 
incentives. This is supposed to change for some institutions. 
The general cultural attitude is said to be in favour of commercialisation because of a 
long tradition of industry-science-relations and because technology transfer is considered 
as a major mission in many institutions. On the other hand, differences in the educational 
background are presented as a possible obstacle to industry-science-relations because, 
in contrast to the US, business managers are generally not scientifically trained (OECD 
2002).  
The type of policies chosen to support commercialisation efforts also shows similarities to 
the US bottom-up model, that is, there is a tendency to state the objective, but not to 
prescribe the means to achieve them (OECD 2002: 78).17 There is a rather large number 
of measures supporting spin-off at the intermediary level and on the micro level of 
promotion programmes, e.g. aimed at education in entrepreneurship and awareness 
raising. These measures are (seemingly) university-centred and less network-oriented as 
for example measures chosen in Germany (OECD 2002: 58). A question of debate is 
whether the strong emphasis on intermediary structures may even create a barrier to a 
common knowledge culture at the industry-science-nexus (OECD 2002: 153). 
To summarise, the UK model of interaction between science system and policy type 
shows in many aspects strong similarities with the US model as described by Goldfarb & 
Henrekson (2003). However, the incentive structure for researchers is comparable to the 
Swedish model. The similarity to the US model in a number of framework conditions may 
be a reason that measures for supporting spin-offs and commercialization of research 
results have lately focused not so much on these, but rather on the intermediary and 
micro level. Accordingly, we may hypothesize that only to a limited extent did these affect 
the science system. The framework conditions in the UK seem only partly to be 
conducive to strong linkages between spin-offs and their parent institutions. Strong 
relationships may to some extent be discouraged because of the design of evaluation 
criteria. As for the regulations relevant for the formal participation of researchers, we do 
not have appropriate data. These will probably vary between institutions, since there is no 
national binding regulation for working contract schemes. 
                                                
17  This is illustrated also by changes made to the HEIF. Formerly there had been two separate 
programmes providing seed capital on the one hand (University Challenge) and support for 
teaching entrepreneurial skills (Science Enterprise Challenge). These programmes were 
integrated, so as to grant universities more freedom in choosing the measures they deem 
appropriate for supporting commercialisation efforts (DTI 2002). 
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3.2 Germany18 
Generally, the German science system can be characterised as a centralised system with 
only little competition between institutions. Research institutions are mostly subordinate 
to public ministries. A specific characteristic is the high differentiation between different 
types of institutions with each having a specific mission according to education, research 
and technology transfer, e.g. (technical) universities, polytechnics or various types of 
research institutes (Fraunhofer-, Max-Planck-, Helmholtz- and Leibniz-Society). Univer-
sities and research institutes are mainly financed by basic funding (about 2/3, respec-
tively 3/4 of funding). It should be noted though that there is high variation between 
different types of research institutes. There is little or no wage flexibility and therefore no 
direct wage-based competition between universities for personnel. However, there are 
currently a couple of structural changes under way. These changes aim at fostering 
academic excellence as well as knowledge transfer seen to enhance the capacity of the 
German innovation system. One may ask though, if the two aims may not partly 
contradict each other. Competitive project and programme-based funding is strengthened 
with respect to basic funding (BMBF 2002). Furthermore, policy aims at introducing more 
competition and qualitative differentiation between research institutions. This is supported 
by measures such as clustering first-class research and the competition for additional 
funding for universities with a specific potential for becoming elite universities. While 
knowledge transfer is mentioned as one criterion characterising excellent universities, the 
main weight lies upon classical academic criteria.19 Therefore, one may expect that this 
type of competition will motivate researchers to concentrate on academic work and not 
put much effort in commercialisation activities. This is also reflected by the concepts 
presented by universities participating in the competition. Out of 10 concepts which had 
been chosen in a first round, only one put the concept of an entrepreneurial university 
centre stage and one university presents knowledge transfer as one element among 
others.20 
In the German system there are no regular evaluations with a direct effect on funding as 
in the British system. Evaluation is carried out mainly at the level of institutes or scientific 
organisations (“Systemevaluation”). We would therefore expect effects to be compara-
tively small and to occur slowly. Performance criteria vary strongly between the different 
types of institutions; thus also effects may vary. At least for some, e.g. Fraunhofer 
institutes, criteria nowadays also consider the number of spin-offs (Meyer-Krahmer & 
Kulicke 2002). With respect to evaluation criteria at the project level, for some sources of 
                                                
18  If not stated otherwise, this section is based on Polt et al. (2001). 
19  Bund-Länder-Vereinbarung gemäß Artikel 91 b des Grundgesetzes (Forschungsförderung) 
über die Exzellenzinitiative des Bundes und der Länder zur Förderung von Wissenschaft und 
Forschung an deutschen Hochschulen, Stand 7.6.2005. 
20  Stuttgarter Zeitung, 27.1.2006, “Wir sind ein armes Land”. 
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funding, commercialisation of results is required. The German Ministry for Education and 
Research (BMBF) has introduced the rule that for results obtained from BMBF funded 
research, intellectual property rights must be applied for and results must be 
commercialised (OECD 2002: 55). 
Researchers at universities and research institutes are partly civil servants. Here, employ-
ment law may hamper commercialisation because it restricts participation in companies 
and earning profits, as well as mobility out of academia (pension schemes). Universities 
and some research institutes are not allowed to earn profits and engage in entre-
preneurial activities, including investment in start-ups. However, university professors 
may dedicate some of their time to an enterprise owned by themselves as a secondary 
activity.  
The regulation concerning intellectual property rights has changed recently. Until 2001, in 
universities researchers were granted intellectual property rights. Accordingly, universities 
have been reported to show little interest in supporting patenting and its exploitation 
(Koschatzky 2002: 250). Since 2002, universities have been granted intellectual property 
rights and royalties are shared equally between university, commercialisation unit and 
inventor. Research institutes had already been granted intellectual property rights. 
Cultural attitudes are supposed to exert an ambivalent effect on the commercialisation of 
research results. On the one hand, there is a long tradition of intense industry-science 
relations in Germany, mainly in specific sectors such as electronics, machinery, and 
chemistry, and in specific institutions such as technical universities and polytechnic 
colleges. On the other hand, the majority of universities are oriented towards a 
Humboldtian model of science emphasising the autonomy of curiosity driven research. In 
an empirical study on German transfer offices at universities it became apparent that this 
Humboldtian model as well as a certain reluctance to embrace a third mission of 
universities was one of the reasons why the universities in the sample did not actively 
support the transfer offices (Krücken 2003). 
The German policy type may be characterised as intermediary, though rather pending 
towards a bottom-up approach. There is a strong focus on framework conditions (macro 
measures) resulting in a number of structural changes (see above). In addition, there is 
also a focus on micro and meso measures. An important instrument here has been the 
EXIST programme: via a competition various regional networks for supporting spin-off 
creation and comprising public and private actors have been supported. While some 
elements were required, there was no prescription of the specific form. Accordingly, each 
network adapted the set goals differently (BMBF 2002; Meyer-Krahmer & Kulicke 2002). 
All networks are engaged in awareness raising, training in entrepreneurship, business 
plan competitions and provision of seed capital. Furthermore, there is a large number of 
transfer organisations, which are again heterogeneously organised; some are institu-
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tionalised at universities, others at the level of the Länder or at the level of a specific type 
of research institute, e.g. the Max-Planck-Society. The latter type is rather specific; most 
other countries follow regional or institution-specific approaches (Rammer et al. 2004). 
Generally, in Germany intermediary institutions are often of a network type (OECD 2002: 
58). Considering all types of measures, Meyer-Krahmer and Kulicke (2002) state that 
since the mid 1990s the creation of spin-offs has strongly gained in importance. 
Indicators are the establishment of various professorships for entrepreneurship, the 
foundation of networks, the large number of initiatives and the creation of internal 
organisations for supporting spin-offs at research institutions as well as the fact that the 
performance of the Fraunhofer Society is now also measured by the number of spin-offs.  
To summarise, the German science system has so far shown a number of similarities to 
the Swedish system, e.g. little competition between universities, rather bureaucratic 
structures with a number of hampering elements for commercial involvement (employ-
ment laws, intellectual property rights until 2001). At a more concrete level of specific 
institutional settings and incentive structures there is, however, a lot of variety due to the 
different types of research institutions. Lately, there are structural changes going on 
which point in the direction of decentralisation and, at some points, an incentive structure 
comparable to the American model (intellectual property rights). The policy approach may 
be considered as an intermediary or almost bottom-up type. 
The strong focus on macro and micro measures may be interpreted as having a strong 
potential for affecting the science system. However, the incentive structure resulting from 
structural changes is ambivalent, thus the concrete effects are difficult to appraise. 
Furthermore, it remains a question for empirical research, in how far micro measures had 
an impact on the entrepreneurial culture of universities.  
Framework conditions in Germany seem to be neither highly conducive nor discouraging 
for strong linkages between spin-offs and their parent institutions because of the 
comparably low impact of evaluation systems (so far), and the possibility for – at least 
professors – to engage in formal links with spin-offs.  
 
3.3 France21 
The French science system is centralised. Research institutions are public and allocation 
of staffing and resources, and also partly priority setting, are decided at the national level. 
All researchers, except doctoral students, are civil servants and contract employment is 
not possible, except for doctoral students. The mobility of researchers to industry is very 
                                                
21  If not stated otherwise, this section is based on OECD (2002). 
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low. Evaluation of researchers is conducted by national disciplinary committees. Industry 
ties have largely been ignored or may even have hampered academic promotion. 
Following the plan d’innovation 2003, activities of researchers and organisations in favour 
of innovation shall now be evaluated too. A number of changes in legislation have been 
introduced in 1999, following the loi d’innovation, which aimed at facilitating the creation 
of spin-offs (see below). Intellectual property rights are generally granted to institutions. 
However, this may vary between institutions, e.g. intellectual property rights may be 
granted to industrial partners with royalties in exchange. Cultural attitudes are supposed 
to be rather unfavourable to academic entrepreneurship, because of the former long-term 
tradition of large public support programmes focussing on industrial champions and a 
tradition of involving engineers in government or large industry corporations (Project 
Group Science Policy Studies (2006)). 
The French policy type can be characterised as a top-down approach. The means to 
achieve objectives are generally stated, for example the shape and function of transfer 
offices at universities. Framework conditions have been changed in a way to lower 
substantial hurdles to spin-off creation. The new regulations include leave regulations for 
researchers and the possibility to hold shares or to act as an executive of a firm. 
Furthermore, it enabled research organisations to provide seed capital and to set up 
incubators and provide funding to do so. It has been stated though that management of 
the industry linkages by a body of the research institution does not generally work 
because of a number of administrative hurdles. Therefore, the management is partly 
provided by subsidiary firms or independent organisations. The setting up of subsidiaries 
for seed funding is a new practice for research institutions and some have started to do 
this. Generally, the effect of the measures provided by the loi d’innovation has been 
stated to be not yet clear (OECD 2002) or even difficult to carry out in practice. The loi 
d’innovation was followed by the plan d’innovation in 2003, which carried a number of 
measures further, e.g. it comprised the modification of transfer institutions, the possibility 
to participate in enterprises for staff at further research organisations and an increase of 
seed capital. Furthermore, incentives for patenting and awareness campaigns in 
universities were provided. 
To summarise, the French science system and the French policy show a number of 
similarities to the Swedish system. A range of measures at the macro level have been 
taken. These concern the facilitation of formal engagements of researchers in spin-offs 
and the evaluation of commercialisation efforts. If the former should show effects, further 
repercussions of the bottom-up type seem possible. Furthermore, a number of measures 
addressed the meso level (transfer offices, support of the creation phase) and some also 
the micro level. As for strong linkages between spin-offs and their parent institution, the 
French system has been rather discouraging in the past. This is due to the discouraging 
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effect of the evaluation procedures and, until recently, the legislation concerning the 
formal involvement of researchers in spin-offs. However, the changes under way may 
modify this picture in the future. 
 
3.4  Finland22 
The Finnish science system has central as well as decentral characteristics. All 
universities are state-run and general objectives and funding levels are set by the ministry 
in discussion with the universities. Yet the legal framework leaves room for individual 
universities to decide on detailed organisation, administration and appointment of 
professors. A further decentralisation process is said to be under way. Universities are 
complemented by public research institutes, which account for about 2/5 of public R&D. 
Researchers are civil servants with rather severe restrictions on possibilities for 
secondary occupation and leave regulations. For the latter consent by the employer is 
required. According to the Act on the Right to Carry on Business it is not acceptable that 
the line between official service and private business becomes vague. However, these 
limitations are said to have only little effect in practice. Similarly, restrictions are set for 
investments of universities in private companies. The provision of funding has become 
increasingly competitive in recent years; the level of competitively distributed funding now 
lies between Germany and the UK, similar to those of Sweden. Evaluation procedures 
are mainly carried out on the aggregate level of organisations with consequences also 
taken mainly at the organisational level. In the case of universities, these have focussed 
largely on teaching performance (Ormala 2001). It is unclear though, if these procedures 
have a favourable or negative effect on researchers’ commercial activities. 
Until recently, intellectual property rights in universities have generally been owned by the 
inventor, but specific arrangements may have applied depending on the funding source of 
the research and the specific arrangements taken; therefore, there is no common scheme. 
The legal framework was changed in 2005, shifting the ownership of intellectual property 
rights to universities (Project Group Science Policy Studies (2006)). Universities have just 
started to provide supportive measures for researchers to make use of intellectual 
property rights. The income from royalties is rather low. In institutions other than public 
sector research institutes intellectual property rights have already belonged to the 
employer. 
Cultural attitudes in universities seem not to work in favour of commercialisation of 
research, since universities are rooted in a strong tradition of “pure” science. In the policy 
realm though, the awareness that science should contribute to the economy is high.  
                                                
22  If not stated otherwise, this section is based on Polt et al. (2001). 
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The Finnish policy type relevant for spin-off creation may be considered as a 
predominantly top-down approach. It consists to a large extent in various programmes 
initiated, funded and organised by the public technology agency TEKES. As far as we 
can see, the only measure on the macro level of framework conditions has been the 
recent change of intellectual property rights regulation. The bulk of measures seem to be 
located at the meso level. With a focus on spin-offs this is the TULI programme co-
ordinated by TEKES, consisting of science parks and incubators searching for research 
results with business potential. In addition, TEKES provides advisory services and capital 
loan schemes. Financing conditions for spin-offs are reported to be generally favourable, 
both by public as well as private sources (EU-Commission 2002). Finally, the SPINNO 
programme provides expert advice. In addition, there are further transfer companies 
jointly owned by universities and other regional organisations, innovation centres at 
universities and technology incubators, which do not only focus on spin-offs, but on 
industry-science relations in general. We do not have appropriate data for the state of 
measures at the micro level. 
In summary, the Finnish model does not fit one of the ideal types of science and policy 
models presented by Goldfarb & Henrekson. As for the profile of measures, we found a 
strong emphasis on measures at the meso level, which we suspect to have the least 
repercussions on the regular academic activities. Similar to the UK, there are almost no 
measures at the macro level except for the recent changes of intellectual property rights 
regulation, but for these it is too early to expect effects. Therefore, we would hypothesise 
that in the Finnish case, repercussions of the top-down type have not been very strong so 
far. Repercussions may nevertheless result bottom-up from linkages between spin-offs 
and universities. We did not find evidence that intense linkages between spin-offs and 
parent organisation of the informal type are specifically discouraged by framework 
conditions. From our data, the effect of evaluation procedures remained unclear. 
However, framework conditions are discouraging for the formal involvement of 
researchers still active in academia and, particularly, for the blurring of boundaries 
between academic and commercial activities.  
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4 Discussion and conclusions 
4.1 Lessons learned from national case studies 
The comparative analysis showed that there is no common Continental-European model 
of science systems and policy styles as assumed by Goldfarb & Henrekson. Rather, we 
found substantial differences in both science systems and policy approaches. This 
corresponds with the findings of other studies that concluded that “there is no European 
model of spin-out programmes” (EU Commission 2002: 49). There is a large variety of 
policies and science systems. At one end of the spectrum we find France, which is quite 
close to the Swedish model, characterised by a centralised science system and a top-
down policy approach which tends to state the means to achieve objectives. At the other 
end we find the UK, which shows a number of similarities to the US model, characterised 
by a decentralised science system and a bottom-up policy type which sets frameworks to 
create incentives to reach objectives, but leaves more freedom as to the means by which 
objectives may be attained. Germany and Finland seem to take an intermediary position 
(see figure 8). Moreover, Germany, and to some extent France, are likely to experience 
the strongest transformations of their position because of current changes in the structure 
of the science system.  
The diagram depicted in figure 
8 could be interpreted as 
representing a nearly linear 
relationship between policy 
type and science system. How-
ever, apart from the fact that 
Germany and Finland deviate 
from this linear relationship, 
one should keep in mind that 
these two dimensions provide 
a very crude characterisation. 
As the – already sketchy – 
presentation of the country 
profiles has shown, each science system has to be characterised by several dimensions 
(or structural elements) to estimate its conduciveness for spin-off formation and potential 
repercussions on the science system. For instance, the UK model is not as similar to the 
US model as the diagrammatic characterisation suggests, because of the differences in 
evaluation procedures. Accordingly, the Goldfarb and Henrekson model seems to be too 
science system
policy type
decentralised
centralised
top-down bottom-up
US
Germany
France
Sweden
UK
Figure 8: countries by type of science system and policy
Finland
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simple to apply for a larger number of countries. Nevertheless, the mechanisms 
highlighted by the model are a useful starting point to analyse the effects of the 
interaction between policy and science systems for national conditions of the commer-
cialisation of research results. 
According to Goldfarb and Henrekson, the specific characteristics of the science system 
and the policy type should explain differences in the number of spin-offs created in a 
country. They could not draw on empirical data to substantiate this hypothesis. From our 
own very limited database, however, it seems that we have to reject this hypothesis: while 
for France we could not find any data, for Germany, Finland and the UK the rate of spin-
off creation seems not to differ strongly (see Appendix). On the other hand, the data are 
not reliable enough to clearly discard the hypothesis. 
It should be highlighted that framework conditions may also vary within countries. This 
may be due to a highly differentiated set of research institutions as in the case of 
Germany, for example, or due to a rather open and flexible framework which leaves room 
for individual institutions to build up diverging structures, as in the case of the UK. In 
contrast to this, France and Finland exhibit a comparatively small internal variety. 
The analysis also made clear that a dynamic perspective is necessary since in Germany 
and France, the science systems seem to be subject to substantial changes. Science 
policy focussed on commercialisation of research results seems to be a major driving 
force. However, a convergence of these science systems towards the US or UK model is 
not to be expected, since each system has too many specific characteristics (see above). 
As already stated by others (Mustar 2003: 637), the set of measures for supporting spin-
offs shows strong similarities in all selected countries. However, as our analysis indicates, 
there seem to be differences in the relative role of specific support measures in the 
overall spin- off promotion. Furthermore, the specific shaping of the measures (e.g. the 
type of transfer institutions established) may differ substantially, but this could not be 
discussed in detail here. In Germany and France, substantial measures have been taken 
at the macro level concerning possibilities for researchers to be involved in spin-offs, the 
regulation of property rights, and also evaluation criteria. However, evaluation criteria, 
which are supposed to be highly important for commercialisation efforts in general, have 
received comparably little attention by policy measures so far. A hypothesis would be that 
this is exactly the case, because changes to evaluation criteria would affect the science 
systems most directly and strongly. More precisely, it may be due to a reluctance of both 
researchers as well as policy actors to give way to more hybrid forms of research (see 
below). Measures at the meso and micro level have been applied in all countries, with the 
UK and Finland seemingly focussing particularly at the meso-level and the UK also giving 
a strong emphasis on the micro level. Accordingly, we expect the following top-down 
repercussions on science systems resulting from policy measures (see 2.3). We expect a 
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strong potential for repercussions because of direct structural changes to the science 
system for Germany and France. These repercussions may show largely in the coming 
years, since measures have been implemented only recently. In the UK, repercussions 
may be expected mainly from supporting measures at the micro level, while Finland 
should show comparatively little top-down repercussions. 
The repercussions of policy measures for supporting spin-offs on the science systems will 
probably not only depend on the measures as such, but also on the interplay between 
policy measures and the science system. For example, while there is obviously a 
convergence in the regulation of intellectual property rights, this regulation may have 
different effects in different countries, which should be monitored in the future. Whether 
incentives given by intellectual property rights will be fully exploited will also depend on 
incentives given by evaluation procedures and on the cultural attitudes concerning the 
commercialisation of research. Accordingly, unfavourable evaluation criteria may 
constitute a barrier in the UK, unfavourable cultural attitudes a barrier in Germany, and, in 
Finland and in France, even both may be a problem. In a similar vein, measures at the 
micro level targeted at creating awareness and building entrepreneurial competences 
could have a stronger impact on the general cultural attitude, if this attitude is already 
favourable as compared to other countries. 
Framework conditions which create incentives for specific types of linkages between spin-
off and parent institutions vary substantially between the countries (see figure 7 and 
table 1).  
 
Table 1:  framework conditions influencing linkages between spin-off and parent 
organisation by country 
 US S UK D F SF 
leave regulation etc. + - +/- +/- - → + - 
evaluation (+) - - +/- - → +? -/+ 
IPR + - + - → + + - → + 
 
Therefore, it may be expected that each country displays a specific distribution of spin-
offs showing a specific form of linkages to their parent institution. For example, a 
hypothesis would be that in the US a rather high percentage of spin-offs is characterised 
by rather intense – formal as well as informal - linkages between spin-off and parent 
institutions, since framework conditions seem to be favourable to both. As a counter-
model, France and Sweden would show a smaller proportion of spin-offs of this type, 
though in France, the situation may be changing. In the UK then, intense interactions are 
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generally not favoured by evaluation criteria, while the situation for a formal involvement 
of researchers is not clear. In Finland, we find the opposite situation. Finally, the German 
framework seems not to discourage intense linkages.  
Following our assessment of potential repercussions of measures (see 2.3), we may 
furthermore speculate that an intense interaction between spin-offs and parent institutions 
will result in comparably strong bottom-up repercussions on parent institutions. This 
seems all the more likely if the linkage includes the direct involvement of researchers in 
spin-offs. Thus, the strongest bottom-up repercussions can be expected for the US, 
followed by Germany, and then by the UK and Finland, while France and Sweden may 
show substantially less.  
Going one step further, we deduce the hypothesis that national patterns of spin-offs may 
differ according to the relative importance of spin-offs fulfilling specific modes of activities 
(see 2.2). According to Stankiewicz (1994), spin-offs, which mainly engage in consultancy 
and R&D contracting, are characterised by rather strong linkages with academia and they 
are partly run by academics retaining their university position. Therefore, we would expect 
a similar distribution of country profiles as for the bottom-up repercussions. Spin-offs, 
which develop technologies to be commercialised through further firms (technology asset 
mode), rely strongly on intellectual property rights and, to some extent, on linkages with 
academia. Here again, the framework in the US seems to be most conducive, followed by 
the UK and France, because of its regulation of intellectual property rights. In the future, 
the situation in France, Germany and Finland may be rather favourable for this type of 
spin-off because of the combination of intellectual property rights and a predominance of 
intense linkages. For spin-offs relying largely on the selling of products, linkages with 
academia are not as important. Here, we expect that a favourable environment 
concerning measures at the meso and micro level (supporting measures for the creation 
phase, transfer offices, awareness and competence campaigns) may be most important. 
Therefore the UK, which has put large emphasis on these measures for quite some time, 
may provide the most favourable environment.  
Our hypotheses on potential repercussions and national patterns of spin-off types are 
extremely tentative though. First of all, the framework condition these assumptions are 
based on are but one of a surely much larger number of factors influencing national 
patterns of spin-off types. Secondly, we do not know of any comparative empirical data 
which could serve to substantiate these assumptions. Thus, an empirical analysis of 
national-specific types and styles of spin-offs and their interaction with academia remains 
an important field for further research. Moreover, in our analysis we could mainly point to 
various ways and forms by which policy measures, as well as the interaction with spin-
offs, may lead to repercussions at research institutions. There is, however, still only very 
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little empirical research, which analyses what the specific repercussions on research 
institutions would be. Again, important work remains to be done here.  
 
4.2 Implications for policy 
Nevertheless, this perspective on different types of spin-offs displaying various patterns 
of linkages to their parent organisation and academia is important also from a policy point 
of view. Depending on which model of spin-offs are presumed, supporting measures may 
turn out differently. Stankiewicz (1994), for example, concluded that policy measures 
presuppose a “Schumpeterian” spin-off model which shows strong similarities to spin-offs 
following the product-mode. Similarly, Mustar (2003) has pointed out that policy measures 
for fostering spin-off creation tend to presume that spin-offs ideally follow a specific 
development model. The spin-off is created by a researcher on the basis of a technology 
license or patent, often in partnership with a business person. Then, the spin-off follows a 
steady growth. Taking into account the variety of spin-off forms, Mustar concludes that 
many of the typical supporting measures targeted at providing risk capital, regulating 
intellectual property or financial management, are not appropriate for a large number of 
spin-offs. A similar critique has been made by further authors who analysed the variety of 
spin-off models (Rappert & Webster 1998; Mustar 2003; Druilhe & Garnsey 2004; Gewin 
2005; Moray & Clarysse 2005; Mustar et al. 2006). Moreover, recent evaluations of spin-
off support policies in the US suggest that these are narrowly inspired by a specific 
disciplinary field of knowledge transfer, namely from the bio-tech sector. Increasingly, 
criticism is coming from other sectors that emphasise their specific form of spin-off life 
cycle (and accordingly of patent regulations, etc.) which is overlooked by the prevailing 
conception of support policies, and even hinders exchange between science and industry 
(Gewin 2005). 
It would be highly interesting now, to conduct a comparative in-depth study of the models 
which underly policy measures for supporting the commercialisation of research and spin-
off creation in different countries, potential changes to these models over time, and to see, 
how they impact the chosen policy measures. More precisely, we may ask which function 
spin-offs are supposed to fulfil in innovation and the science system. One may think of at 
least four types: are spin-offs supposed to a) create significant economic effects, e.g. 
employment, b) fulfil a linear transfer function (this does not necessarily imply growth), c) 
allow for continuous co-operation between science and industry (in contrast to linear 
transfer), while spin-off and parent institution follow a particular rationale and fulfil distinct 
functions, or d) are spin-offs and parent institution supposed to produce knowledge in a 
more integrative or hybrid way, that is, borders between the two are continuously crossed? 
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Such an analysis however is beyond the scope of this study. Considering just a number 
of exemplary policy documents, it seems that the models about the role of spin-offs may 
be located somewhere between the two ideal types presented in section 2.2: the triple 
helix II model, where spin-offs are supposed to rapidly decouple from their parent 
institution and the triple helix III model, where spin-offs function as hybrid organisations 
exerting strong interactions with the parent organisation which are not always clearly 
circumscribed. More precisely, it seems to be assumed by policy (actors) that spin-offs 
may entertain continuous interactions with their parent organisations. This is indicated e.g. 
by the presentation of outstanding examples of spin-offs in a British policy document 
which show exactly this attribute (DTI 2000: 28), or by the fact that French policy refers to 
“young innovating enterprises emanating from or linked to public research” (MER 2005). 
However, a blurring of boundaries between research institution and spin-off and 
academic and commercial activities is clearly disapproved. This is indicated by the 
argumentation in the British document just mentioned as to why a separate third stream 
of funding is necessary to support commercialisation efforts, while the regular British 
research evaluation procedure (RAE) should not “be used to divert research funds to 
support universities’ applied work with business, instead of its present focus on excellent 
fundamental research” (DTI 2000: 20). As for the French policy, the loi d’innovation de 
1999 grants the possibility to research staff to engage in the creation of a company while 
retaining their status as a civil servant. This is under the condition that they step back 
from their academic position and decide, after a maximum of 6 years, either to remain 
with the company or turn back to academia.23  
As has been discussed in section 2, the effects of a blurring of boundaries between aca-
demic and commercial work are quite ambiguous. Considering the potential benefits of 
hybrid constellations, it is at least a point for discussion, if regulatory frameworks should 
not allow for transgressions of boundaries. The main challenge remains, however, to 
identify under which specific conditions a hybrid constellation is beneficial, and what 
would be an appropriate framework to foster these conditions.  
 
4.3 Implications for further research 
The present study aimed at providing a number of hypotheses as to how spin-off creation, 
operation, and support may influence the science system. We have specified these 
hypotheses by drawing on evidence of recent experiences from selected European 
countries. A thorough assessment of the importance of spin-offs for the development of 
                                                
23  What is possible though for research staff on a continuous basis, is to provide consulting or 
contribute to the capital of a firm. 
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the national science and/or the national innovation systems would need a much more 
detailed analysis. An empirical and partly explorative study is also needed to develop a 
clearer picture of the specific repercussions at different levels of the science system, e.g. 
at the organisational level, concerning research and teaching practices, or concerning 
role and career models. In the final section, we will therefore summarise our main 
conclusions in the form of research questions and comparative dimensions that could 
serve as a starting point for an empirical comparative research project at the European 
level, such as the currently starting PROKNOW project.24  
We have shown that the national science systems in Europe and their associate science 
policy approaches may not be easily subsumed under one specific style. Rather, the 
national systems differ in a wide number of respects. As has been shown, national 
differences may result from the specific structure of the science system, the specific 
profile of supporting measures, and the interaction of both. Furthermore, they may result 
from different patterns of linkages between spin-off and research institutions. 
The assessment of impacts of spin-off creation and operation, and of specific spin-off 
policies, will therefore depend on the specific structure, culture and history of the national 
science system. Thus, a research concept for analysing the role and impact of spin-offs 
for the respective science systems has to take into account a number of dimensions 
along which the national science systems may differ and which may influence the 
repercussions. From our analysis we propose the following:  
- structure of the science system: decentralized vs. centralized 
- evaluation criteria and procedures 
- cultural attitudes of researchers towards economic activities: lower level activities vs. 
part of a normal portfolio of biographical success 
- institutional boundaries between the science and the economic systems, e.g. in the 
form of leave regulations, working contract schemes and civil servant laws 
- intellectual property rights. 
When aiming at a comparative analytical framework, it is important to be aware of the 
internal heterogeneity that may exist within each country. Conditions may change 
depending on whether a university or a research institute is considered, depending on 
which kind of discipline or sector is at stake, and perhaps also in which region a specific 
promotional activity is taking place. Ultimately, individual and historically contingent 
factors may play a role that may not be grasped in a rough comparative framework. 
                                                
24  For more detail see http://www.wz-berlin.de/ag/wp/default.en.htm. 
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Furthermore, the science systems are moving targets. Therefore, comparisons have to 
take dynamic aspects into account. This implies for example that an analysis and 
comparison of case studies – either case studies of specific spin-offs or national case 
studies - has to take the time dimension quite carefully into account, since framework 
conditions may differ substantially between one point in time and another. And given the 
substantial internal heterogeneity within at least some countries, the overall direction of 
development may be extremely difficult to assess. 
A second cluster of research questions and comparative dimensions relates to the 
national policy measures for supporting spin-off creation as well as industry-science-
relations. Policies for supporting spin-offs show strong similarities over a wide range of 
countries. However, the relative weight attributed to the individual policies seems to differ, 
as well as the specific shaping of the measures. We might therefore expect to find 
specific national styles in the details, where at a general level there seems to be 
convergence. And, as has been elaborated above, the specific profile of policy measures 
may result in a particular profile of repercussions.  
More specifically, with respect to measures at the macro level, it remains to be empirically 
analysed to what extent different framework conditions, e.g. evaluation criteria or leave 
regulation, influence research and teaching practices and, also, if and how they influence 
the interaction between spin-offs and parent organisations. This may be analysed by 
tracing back the impacts of changes to framework conditions within a country or by 
analysing varying framework conditions in different countries. As for supporting measures 
at the meso level, we may ask whether intermediary organisations as transfer offices etc. 
function independently from the regular processes in the research institutions or if both 
interact more intensely. In the latter case and in contrast to what we have assumed in this 
report, substantial repercussions may also result from measures at this level. Finally, it 
remains to be empirically analysed to what extent (the specific) supporting measures at 
the micro level as awareness campaigns within research institutions indeed affect the 
cultural attitudes of students and staff. 
Thirdly, the interaction between policies and structural elements of the science system is 
likely to give rise to differentiated distributions of spin-offs with respect to the patterns of 
linkages between spin-off and parent institution and with respect to the modes of 
activities fulfilled by the spin-offs. For instance, countries with a cultural attitude and 
entry/exit rules for academics which create low barriers are expected to have a high 
percentage of spin-offs depending on intense linkages between spin-off and parent 
institution.  
An intense interaction between spin-offs and parent institution is supposed to result in 
comparably strong bottom-up repercussions on parent institutions. This seems all the 
more likely if the linkage includes the direct involvement of researchers in spin-offs. 
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Therefore, a study which aims at exploring bottom-up repercussions may usefully 
concentrate on this type of spin-off. However, one should be aware and take into account 
that there are other types of spin-offs, e.g. by estimating the relevance of the specific type 
of spin-off under scrutiny.  
These three fields of investigation may serve to support a comparative analysis of spin-off 
activity, and would ultimately lead to a more adequate and encompassing assessment of 
the role and importance of spin-off activity within the science system(s). While obviously a 
lot of research remains to be done, our study should at least have shown that it is 
necessary and timely to shift the analytical focus back from spin-off promotion to potential 
repercussions on research institutions, that a (national) comparative approach to 
analysing the spin-off phenomenon is necessary in addition to the comparative analyses 
of the broader national innovation system conducted so far, and that a differentiated view 
on the spin-off phenomenon is called for, particularly from a policy perspective. Finally, 
this type of study promises to produce substantial results for the assessment of the spin-
off phenomenon as an element in and indicator for a larger transformation process of 
knowledge production happening within the science-industry-policy triangle. 
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5 Appendix 
The following table provides an overview of various structural characteristics of the national science systems and policy styles in the countries treated in 
the report. The data for the US and Sweden is based on Goldfarb & Henrekson (2003), complemented by Polt et al. (2001); other countries are based 
on Polt et al., if not stated otherwise. For the share of research conducted by publicly funded organisations (HEI + PSRE), relevance of universities, 
share of R&D of GDP and share of business funded research in publicly funded organisations, see diagrams in OECD (2002: 32).  
Table A. 1: Science systems and policy measures by countries 
 US1 Sweden UK2 
organisational structure 
of universities 
decentralised, competition for personnel and funding centralised, little competition decentralised, no common working contract schemes 
however: centralising effect of research councils and RAE3 
R&D spending - HEI (%) 144 22 19 
- PSRE (%) 8 4 15 
- industry (%) 75 75 66 
basic funding (%) HEI:<20 / Psre: 75 51 HEI: 36, Psre: 25 
project/competitive (%) HEI:>80 / Psre:255 49 HEI: 64, Psre: 75 
IPR, Incentives for 
universities 
universities are granted IPR, sharing of royalties required by 
law 
TT is part of evaluation of HEI6 
researchers are granted IPR; universities do not profit from 
commercialisation activities of personnel 
current arrangement comparable to US; has changed in the 
past;  
sharing of royalties encouraged in institute guidelines7 
various sets of rules (OECD 2002) 
incentive for academic 
staff 
rather large “freedom” to engage in commercialisation (e.g. 
possibility to take leaves, consulting privileges) evaluation 
criteria? 
professors at HEI are mostly salaried for 9 months 
at PSRE the situation is less favorable; employees are civil 
servants 
evaluation criteria are purely academic, rather restrictive 
leave regulation8 
3rd mission of universities: commercialisation; PSRE: ISR as 
objective, evaluation criteria, awareness measures 
employees at PSRE are no civil servants 
highly competitive funding structure clearly focussed on 
academic criteria thereby not giving incentive to ISR9; third 
leg of funding shall add incentives for commercialisation 
activities10 
employment arrangement mainly neutral with exception of 
government research institutes 
cultural attitude long tradition of ISR, partly through military research 
projects 
wide-spread debate on systems of innovation; general 
framework supposed to be favourable to ISR11 
rather in favour of commercialisation 
business managers are typically not scientifically trained (in 
contrast to the situation in the US)12 
policy type bottom-up: setting of framework13 top-down: implementation of specific measures tendency to bottom-up approaches setting goals, but not 
prescribing the means to achieve them14 
measures supporting 
HEI, PSRE spin-offs 
various public and private measures supporting ISR and 
spin-offs 
all publicly funded: 
technopole infrastructure, part of univ or science parks, 
publicly funded 
Technology Bridge Foundations 
university holding companies supposed to become minority 
owners 
educational programmes for entrepreneurship 
various educational programmes for entrepreneurship, 
HEIF (formerly also University Challenge, Science 
Enterprise Challenge) 
spin-off creation15 no systematic data, spin-offs from HEI are reported to be 
high (>3); at PSRE somewhat lower 
no systematic data; comparative (non representative) study 
rather suggests similar situation as Finland 
spin-offs from HEI are supposed to be rather high, from 
PSRE medium. 
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 Germany France16 Finland 
organisational 
structure of 
universities 
little competition, centralised 
changes in the direction of more competition, e.g. 
competition for elite universities ” 
all universities are public, staffing and resources are decided 
at the national level; mainly centralised priority setting and 
allocation of resources; no contract employment possible 
except for doctoral students, but civil servants 
all universities state-run, general objectives and funding 
levels set by the ministry and the universities, legal frame-
work leaves room for individual universities to decide on 
detailed organisation, administration, appointment of 
professors (decentralisation process under way) 
industry 69 ~ 62 68 
PSRE 14  12 
HEI 17  20 
basic fund. HEI: 67, Psre:77  HEI: 46 PSRE: 55 
project/competition HEI: 33, Psre: 23  HEI: 54, PSRE: 45 
IPR, Incentives for 
universities 
until 2001: researchers were granted IPR; since 2002 
universities are granted IPR (royalties are equally shared 
between university, commercialisation unit and inventor). 
PSRE are granted IPR 
performance FhG is also measured by number of spin-offs 
generally IPR are granted to institutions, however, this may 
vary between institutions, e.g. IPR may be granted to 
industrial partners with royalties in exchange 
sharing of royalties (in public labs) 
IPR in universities is generally owned by the inventor, 
specific arrangements depending on the financer of the 
research 
in other institutions IPR belong to the employer 
incentive for 
academic staff 
restriction for participation in companies and earning 
profits 
mainly “Systemevaluation” of the scienctific organisations; 
partly evaluation of universities; no binding evaluations as 
e.g. in the British system 
BMBF funded research: researchers are required to apply 
for IPR and commercialise results17 
researchers are civil servants; incentive structures are 
centralised 
loi d’innovation changed leave regulations; possibilities to 
hold shares or act as executive of a firm 
researchers are evaluated by disciplinary committees, 
industry ties ignore or hamper academic promotion; slow 
changes under way 
researchers are mostly civil servants, who are limited in 
their right to hold secondary occupations.  
cultural attitude Long tradition of ISR versus Humboldtian science model not favourable to academic entrepreneurship: tradition of 
large public support programmes and tradition of involving 
engineers in government or large industry corporations18 
policy: high awareness that science should contribute to the 
economy; in universities strong tradition of “pure” science 
policy type in between: EXIST: no specific prescription, but certain 
elements were given, each network adapted the set goals 
differently19; further (non-prescriptive) impact of the 
competition, e.g. on non-winning participants  
 top-down, means to achive objectives are generally stated top-down, centrally co-ordinated, e.g. TULI/SPINNO 
programme: publicly initiated and funded20,  
 
measures supporting 
HEI, PSRE spin-offs 
EXIST: regional networks, EEF, seed capital comparatively 
low21 
cross-institutional initiative for exploitation of patents (most 
other countries follow regional or institution-specific 
approaches)22 
loi d’innovation 1999: changes of framework for fostering 
spin-offs, also measures as providing funding for seed capital 
and incubators; plan d’innovation 2003: awareness campaign 
and incentives for patenting, possibility to participate in 
enterprises for further research organisations, increase of 
seed capital23 
2 national supporting measures for founders (consulting, 
financing); French measures are focussed on early founding 
phases24 
TULI programme: science parks and incubators;  
furthermore TEKES provides advisory services and capital 
loan schemes; SPINNO programme providing advice by a 
network of experts; furthermore, not focusing specifically on 
spin-offs: S&T parks, technology transfer companies, partly 
owned by university foundations, innovation centres, 
technology incubators 
spin-off creation HEI: 3-4, PSRE 2-3 no data HEI: 2-3, PSRE ~1 
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Notes to Table A. 1 
                                                
1  See also Etzkowitz et al. 2000.  
2  See also Etzkowitz et al. 2000. 
3  OECD 2002: 73 
4  3% private non-profit 
5  Estimations  
6  OECD 2002: 58 
7  OECD 2002: 53 
8  Polt et al. 2001: 215: research outside university is no qualification for career as university researcher; leaves are possible for up to 6 months, if this does not create 
inconvenience to the employer; contact researcher: university researchers may work full or part time for a company for a certain period 
9  Roberts 2003 cited in Rammer et al. (2004: 138). 
10  Etzkowitz et al. 2000: UK Higher Education Funding Council requests that patents are considered as evidence of quality research in RAE; however also evidence that 
regime change to entrepreneurial university is not always realised 
11  Polt et al. 2001: 214; no specification of this statement 
12  OECD 2002 
13  For an overview of various legislative acts in favour of ISR see Polt et al. (2001: 278f.). 
14  OECD 2002: 78 
15  Numbers refer to number of technology-based start-ups in HEI / PSRE per 1’000 R&D personnel (OECD 2002). 
16 Mainly based on OECD 2002. 
17 OECD 2002: 55 
18 Project Group Science Policy Studies (2006) 
19 Meyer-Krahmer & Kulicke 2002: 271 
20 (Novakovic & Sturn 2000) 
21 Rammer et al. 2004: 120 
22 Rammer et al. 2004: 134 
23 Rammer et al. 2004: 212f. 
24 Koschatzky 2002 
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